دستور نيوز
Hazem Duckel
In moments of political transformations, some administrative steps seem small, even technical, that do not require concern: a delegation visit here, a meeting there, or limited funding under the title of “strengthening cooperation.” But international experiences show that the most dangerous decisions are not announced in their final form, but rather begin gradually. In calm language, and with titles that appear neutral and attractive.
Perhaps the Iraqi experience with Sweden provides a very significant example. What began in 2008 as an understanding to organize the “return” between Baghdad and Stockholm, later turned into a framework that facilitated the deportation of Iraqis whose asylum applications were rejected. The problem was not that there was cooperation between two countries, but rather that an agreement that seemed administrative in its text became political and social in its effect.
Today, with indications of increasing rapprochement between Stockholm and Damascus on the issues of immigration and return, a question arises that cannot be ignored: Are we facing a normal administrative path, or the beginning of arrangements that may affect the future of thousands of Syrians residing in Europe?
The problem does not lie in the principle of cooperation itself, as countries naturally cooperate to regulate several issues, including immigration. But what calls for caution is the context in which this cooperation comes: a European context that is moving towards tightening asylum policies, mounting political pressure to increase deportations, and transforming “return” from a voluntary option into a tool within internal and electoral policies.
Hence, the discussion does not seem technical as much as it is political par excellence. What is proposed today as regulatory measures may, if not read carefully, turn into a path that is difficult to reverse later.
The Swedish context: from receiving refugees to engineering return
To understand the implications of any Swedish-Syrian rapprochement on the immigration issue, we must first look at the broader transformation that Sweden has witnessed in recent years. After it was presented as a more open European model for asylum, since 2015 it has gradually tended to tighten its policies, by reducing protection opportunities, adopting temporary residency instead of permanent residency, and tightening the conditions for unification. This transformation was not only technical, but a reflection of a deeper political transformation.
Internally, immigration has become one of the most sensitive issues in public debate, and a central card in party competition. The rising influence of the Sweden Democrats, as an extremist right-wing force, has contributed to pushing the political debate towards greater extremism, even among some traditional parties. Within this context, the talk is no longer just about receiving refugees, but about reducing their numbers, increasing “returns,” and implementing deportation decisions more effectively.
In this context specifically, there is talk of strengthening cooperation with Syrian parties. Financial resources have been allocated to support this path, not as a purely humanitarian project, but as part of a broader policy aimed at facilitating returns. Whether it is voluntary by providing sums of money to returnees, or forced in some cases. Here lies the importance of reading these steps within their context: they do not come in a vacuum, but rather within a clear political trend that seeks to redefine the relationship between Europe and the refugees on its soil.
In other words, what today appears as limited administrative coordination is, at its core, linked to a broader shift in Swedish policy; A transformation that makes “return” a central goal, not just a secondary option.
Iraq precedent: when the text precedes the implementation by one step
Iraq’s experience with Sweden in 2008 provides an example that cannot be ignored when reading about any similar rapprochement today. At that time, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the two countries under the title “Organizing the Return,” which ostensibly stipulated that priority be given to what was called voluntary return, with an emphasis on respect for human dignity and administrative cooperation between the two parties.
But what seemed at the time to be a technical agreement to regulate legal conditions gradually turned into a more effective tool for the Swedish authorities to implement deportation decisions. With the establishment of channels of cooperation, the possibility of proving identity, and the issuance of travel documents, return has become no longer a negotiated option but an enforceable measure, especially for those whose asylum applications have been ultimately rejected.
This transformation did not remain theoretical; More than 38,000 Iraqis have been affected by decisions to return from Sweden over the past two decades, including more than 20,000 who returned voluntarily, while others were subjected to forced deportation or went into hiding from the authorities. Hundreds of Iraqis were also forcibly returned during the first years after the signing of the agreement, at a time when the security situation in Iraq was still the subject of international controversy.
However, the deeper impact was not in the numbers alone, but rather in the complex human transformations that these numbers reflect: families divided between two countries, children who settled in Swedish schools and then found themselves facing the possibility of forced departure, and fathers and mothers who were returned while the rest of the family remained in Sweden. In such cases, “deportation” is not just a legal procedure, but an event that reshapes an entire life.
The problem, then, was not in the text of the agreement itself, but in the path it opened. The difference between “voluntary return” as it is formulated in the documents, and the reality of forced deportation as it is later practiced, reveals a fundamental gap between text and application. It is this gap that allowed a gradual transition from a humanitarian discourse to an administrative practice with profound social and humanitarian implications.
Hence, the Iraqi precedent does not appear to be just a historical experience, but rather a warning mirror: what is initially presented as limited administrative coordination may, due to the political context and internal pressures, turn into a framework used to expand the scope of deportation, far beyond what was understood when it was signed. This is precisely what makes any discussion about a similar agreement with Syria today an issue that goes beyond politics, affecting the fate of thousands of families who may find themselves facing the same scenario.
Indicators of convergence… that cannot be separated from context
If the Iraqi precedent provides a lesson from the past, what is happening today presents a set of indicators that require careful reading, without jumping to preconceived conclusions.
During the past months, relations between Sweden and Syria have witnessed remarkable movements, including visits by Swedish officials to Damascus, and the opening of direct channels of communication with Syrian parties on issues related to immigration and return. These visits, although presented in an “exploratory” or “technical” framework, reflect a growing interest in revitalizing cooperation in this field.
At the same time, there is talk of receiving a Syrian technical delegation in Stockholm, in a step that aims, according to official statements, to discuss procedural issues such as proving identity, issuing travel documents, and coordination mechanisms between the institutions concerned. Such steps are, by nature, preliminary, but they also form the foundation for any broader future cooperation.
Within this context, the Swedish government has allocated funding estimated at approximately three million kroner to support this path through the Swedish Migration Agency, including preparing preliminary studies and strengthening communication channels with the Syrian side. Funding here is not understood in isolation from the general trend in Swedish policies, but rather as part of a broader approach to managing the “return” file.
In addition, there is an increasing focus in political discourse on specific groups, especially people against whom judicial rulings or final deportation decisions have been issued. This approach is usually presented as a limited measure targeting “special” cases, but at the same time it reflects a shift in priorities, from managing asylum to implementing deportation.
Taken together, these developments do not constitute a comprehensive agreement in and of themselves, but they do outline a path in the making: a path that begins with technical cooperation, and progresses through small steps that may seem disconnected, but gain their full meaning when viewed within their broader political context.
The real danger: from the exception to the rule
The danger on such paths does not usually lie in a direct mass deportation announcement; this rarely happens in this form. The risk starts much earlier: in building the technical channels that make migration possible, orderly, and repeatable. When mechanisms for establishing identity, issuing travel documents, and determining recipient destinations are opened, deportation decisions become easier to implement, even if it is initially presented as limited cooperation.
These policies often start from “special cases”: people who have been convicted, had their claims rejected, or have had final decisions issued against them. These are categories that are easy to market politically, because they do not arouse public sympathy to the same extent. But past experience shows that the exception can over time become the rule, and that the architecture created to handle specific cases can later be used to scale returns and migration.
It is precisely here that the technical agreement becomes a political tool; A government facing internal pressure to increase deportations can tell its public that it has established channels of cooperation with the country of origin, and that the obstacle is no longer administrative as it was. Once deportation becomes practically possible, its expansion becomes a matter of political decision and legal discretion, not a matter of principle.
As for humanity, the impact is not measured only by the number of deportees. Behind every file there is a life formed in Sweden: a family, school, language, work, treatment, a social network, and children who may know nothing of Syria except what they heard from their parents. Any uncalculated course may put these people in the face of a forced rupture from their daily reality, separate family members between two countries, or push some people to disappear for fear of deportation.
Therefore, it is not enough to say that cooperation targets “specific groups.” The most important question is: What are the guarantees that prevent this cooperation from turning into a broader policy? Who monitors its application? How are families, children, women and those already integrated into Swedish society protected? Without clear answers, administrative coordination becomes an open door to consequences that are difficult to control later.
A message to the Syrian Foreign Ministry
In this particular file, it is not enough to view negotiation as a traditional diplomatic affair. The Syrian party is negotiating not only as a country seeking to regain its international presence and political recognition, but also as a party that bears a political and moral responsibility towards hundreds of thousands of Syrians whose lives have settled outside the country and who have built a new social, educational and professional reality after years of war and asylum.
From here, caution becomes a duty, not an option. Any agreement regarding return or readmission must not be signed without clear and binding guarantees that prevent it from becoming an instrument for open or unsafe deportation. Also, general formulations, no matter how technical or neutral they may seem, may later become a gateway to expanding the scope of application, especially if the relevant groups are not precisely defined, and the procedures are not linked to clear legal and humanitarian oversight.
Most importantly, the file should be read within its internal Swedish context. Immigration there is not only an administrative issue, but rather part of an escalating political and electoral conflict. Any understanding with Damascus will not only be used to organize documents or prove identity, but will also be presented internally as an achievement in the process of increasing deportation. Therefore, this file should not be negotiated according to the logic of relations between governments alone, but rather according to the logic of responsibility towards the people who may pay the price for any miscalculation.
#dont #stung #Iraqis
So that we don’t get stung twice like the Iraqis!
– الدستور نيوز
اراء و اقلام الدستور – So that we don’t get stung twice like the Iraqis!
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