دستور نيوز
Written by Dr. Ibrahim Al-Arab
The general amnesty file is being raised in Lebanese political corridors as one of the most sensitive and controversial files, not only because it is an exceptional legal measure aimed at alleviating overcrowding in prisons or addressing the humanitarian effects resulting from prolonged detention and trials, but because it has become a mirror that reflects a deeper crisis related to the nature of the Lebanese state and the extent of its ability to produce balanced justice that is not subject to the balance of political and sectarian forces.
In constitutional jurisprudence, amnesty is not a political favor that the authority grants to whomever it wishes and withholds it from whomever it wishes, nor is it a tool for circumstantial settlements between parliamentary blocs and influential forces. Rather, it is an exceptional sovereign and legislative act that is supposed to be based on a clear legal philosophy, based on turning the page on a crisis phase, reintegrating social groups into national life, and addressing the effects of judicial and penal imbalance, without turning into a means of reproducing injustice or perpetuating fragmented justice and deepening feelings. Injustice among certain Lebanese groups.
Hence, the academic approach to general amnesty requires focusing on the essential characteristic of this concept, which is “generality.” Amnesty cannot be general unless it is extended to specific groups according to objective and abstract criteria, and not according to political, sectarian, or vindictive considerations. However, when the law is tailored to specific parties, or large groups are excluded due to their political affiliations or social and sectarian backgrounds, we are not facing a general amnesty in the constitutional and legal sense, but rather we are facing selective, disguised legislation that lacks the spirit of justice, regardless of the apparent legal forms it takes.
Amnesty, in its supreme philosophy, aims to rebuild trust between the citizen and the state and address the effects of the exceptional stages that left wounds within society, not to open new wounds under legislative cover. Therefore, it should not be an extension of the political struggle within Parliament or a reflection of power equations outside the institutions, but rather it should constitute an expression of a unified national will to correct the imbalance, remove injustice, and establish the principle of equality before the law.
In this context, the constitutional principle of equality emerges as the cornerstone of any discussion of general amnesty. Article Seven of the Lebanese Constitution explicitly states that “all Lebanese are equal before the law,” and enjoy civil and political rights and bear public duties without discrimination. This article is not a moral declaration or a theoretical principle, but rather a binding constitutional rule that prevents the legislator from enacting laws that are based on unjustified discrimination or the exclusion of one group in favor of another.
Accordingly, any amnesty law that excludes a wide segment of the Lebanese, especially members of the Sunni sect, many of whom are linked to the files of what are known as “Islamic detainees,” raises a deep constitutional problem. The issue is not related to a sectarian or sectarian defense, but rather to the essence of the idea of the legal state. A state that claims to respect the constitution cannot adopt double standards, pardoning certain groups and being harsh with others, or condoning crimes when their perpetrators are influential, while dealing harshly with files related to weakly protected political or social environments.
Hence, selectivity in amnesty represents a form of legislative injustice. Injustice does not only result from an unjust judicial ruling, arbitrary arrest, or an investigation extracted under pressure, but it may also result from a discriminatory law based on unfair standards or on the deliberate exclusion of a group from its right to redress. Here lies the danger of what could be called the “renewed injustice project,” that is, when the law itself turns from a tool for protecting rights into a means for perpetuating injustice.
Partial justice is not justice, because by its nature it does not tolerate selection or division. If an essential component of the nation feels that the judiciary is being harshly applied to it while others are granted political protection or leniency, this not only threatens confidence in institutions, but also strikes civil peace at its core. Civil peace is not based on balancing fear, silencing the oppressed, or managing crises using the logic of temporary settlements, but rather on the feeling of all citizens that the state deals with them according to one standard and subjects them to the same law without discrimination.
From both humanitarian and legal angles, the reality of Lebanese prisons constitutes one of the most prominent aspects of the crisis. Lebanon has been suffering for years from the dilemma of long pretrial detention, as a large number of detainees remained for years without final judgments being issued against them. This phenomenon cannot be reduced to an administrative problem or a passing judicial detail, because it touches the essence of the right to personal freedom, a fair trial, and the presumption of innocence, which are basic principles in modern criminal law.
Preventive detention is, in essence, an exceptional measure that may not be turned into a prior punishment. If it continues for years without a fair and speedy trial, this constitutes a serious deviation in the function of criminal justice. A detainee whose guilt has not been proven by a final ruling may not be treated as if he were convicted, and a state that is unable to try a person within a reasonable period does not have the right to keep him hostage to this inability indefinitely.
From this standpoint, the file of “Islamic detainees” and other files of long detention should be approached with a legal and humanitarian logic, away from political militancy. There are families that have been destroyed, young people whose lives have been wasted, mothers waiting for their children behind bars, and entire environments that feel that their children are paying the price for regional circumstances or security calculations and political positions whose facts have changed. The continuation of this reality does not only represent an individual tragedy, but also reveals an institutional failure of the state to perform one of its most important functions, namely achieving justice within a reasonable time and in accordance with clear legal guarantees.
The matter becomes more complicated with the shortcomings of the judicial facility in Lebanon, as it is no longer a secret the extent of the delay in hearings, the disruption of trials, the accumulation of files, the constant transfer of cases between judges, and the absence of judicial resolution. This crisis is not only technical, but also political and institutional. It has accumulated as a result of political interventions and the effects of previous stages, first and foremost the stage of Syrian tutelage and then the stage of the state’s hegemony over state institutions.
If the judiciary were truly independent, public prosecutions were far from political and security pressures, and courts were capable of deciding cases according to unified standards and a regular rhythm, prisons would not have turned into long waiting areas, files would not have remained pending for years, and society would not have been forced to demand a general amnesty as a gateway to correcting mistakes that the judiciary was supposed to address from the beginning.
Therefore, the problem does not lie only in the presence of detainees and prisoners, but in the growing feeling that justice is not the same. This feeling, when it accumulates, becomes more dangerous than the texts themselves because it creates a deep gap between the citizen and the state. A citizen who loses confidence in the judiciary loses confidence in the idea of the state itself.
In this context, we cannot ignore the harsh and absent-minded sentences that were issued against a number of young people, especially those from the Sunni environment, in exchange for acquitting or protecting others who committed similar or more serious acts. This comparison is not a call to acquit the guilty or tolerate crimes, but rather a call to apply one standard to everyone. A just state does not punish one group and protect another, but rather weighs actions on the scale of the law, not on the scale of political or sectarian identity.
Also, many of the rulings that affected young people from this environment were linked to political backgrounds related to the position on the Syrian revolution in its beginnings. The irony is that positions that were a reason for criminalization and prosecution at a certain stage later became part of a political discourse adopted by the majority of political forces in Lebanon and the region. This raises a fundamental question: Is it permissible for people to continue to pay the price of a political phase whose conditions and standards have changed? Is it appropriate to continue punishment against backgrounds that are no longer read according to the same standards today?
Therefore, if political and security conditions have affected investigations and trials, it is necessary to reconsider these files within a comprehensive approach, not with the aim of wasting public rights, but rather with the aim of purifying justice from the impurities of politicization and selectivity.
The matter becomes more dangerous with what has been repeatedly raised about some investigations on which judgments or accusations were based, in terms of extracting statements under torture or psychological pressure and harsh interrogation conditions. In modern criminal law, any confession extracted under duress has no value, because the confession is not evidence unless it is issued by free and conscious will and under full legal guarantees. As for a confession extracted under torture, it is evidence of a violation of justice, not of its achievement. Any self-respecting judicial system cannot base its rulings on coerced statements. If there are serious suspicions about the circumstances of the investigation, reviewing these files becomes a legal and moral duty, not just a political option. Hence, a comprehensive and just general amnesty may constitute a necessary approach to addressing these accumulations, not as an alternative to the judiciary, but rather as a legislative correction for exceptional conditions resulting from the inability of the judiciary, political interference, and distortions of investigation and trial.
Here it is necessary to distinguish between a general amnesty as a tool for transitional justice, and an amnesty as a political deal. Transitional justice is based on recognition of the defect, reparation of harm, reintegration of those affected, restoration of public confidence, and the pursuit of national reconciliation, while the political deal is based on the exchange of interests between influential powers and the use of the law as a cover for narrow settlements. The danger today is that the general amnesty in Lebanon will turn into a political bargaining tool instead of a national project to address a thorny humanitarian and legal file.
Justice must be based on inclusion, fairness and equality, not on exclusion and exclusion. An amnesty that does not do justice to the oppressed does not create reconciliation, but rather generates new bitterness, just as an amnesty that addresses some issues and leaves others hostage in prisons does not turn the page, but rather tears it.
From this standpoint, supporting the position of the Mufti of the Lebanese Republic, Sheikh Dr. Abdul Latif Derian, may God protect him, in his demand for justice for the oppressed should not be read from a narrow sectarian perspective, because the demand is, in essence, national, constitutional, and humanitarian. When Dar Al-Fatwa raises its voice in defense of the oppressed, it is not only defending specific individuals, but rather a basic principle that justice should not be selective, that human dignity is not subject to statute of limitations, and that the Sunni community, as an essential component of the Lebanese entity, should not be treated as a reservoir for accusations or as an arena for settling scores. Justice for imprisoned clerics who have been targeted because of their positions, symbolism, or social role constitutes an essential step in restoring trust. Targeting clergy, when it is based on political backgrounds and not on established criminal acts, does not affect individuals alone, but rather affects the collective conscience of the sect and opens the door to a deep feeling of humiliation and injustice. Therefore, addressing this aspect is not a detail, but rather part of restoring a national dignity that has suffered major cracks.
In this context, religious institutions, most notably Dar al-Fatwa, play an important social and moral role in confronting political encroachment and attempts to dismantle society during moments of severe division. When these institutions raise their voices on a humanitarian issue, the political authority is supposed to listen and address, not maneuver or postpone.
Therefore, the Lebanese Parliament today faces a severe test. The general amnesty file can no longer tolerate procrastination or the rotation of discussion between committees awaiting political settlements. Every day of delay means continued human suffering, an exacerbation of the feeling of injustice, and an erosion of trust between a wide segment of the Lebanese people and state institutions. It is also no longer acceptable for this file to remain hostage to electoral calculations, sectarian balances, or the conditions of influential powers.
What is required of the representatives is not to issue any amnesty law, however agreed upon, but rather to approve a fair, comprehensive and balanced law, based on clear legal standards, and applied to everyone without discrimination, taking into account the requirements of public rights and the rights of victims wherever they exist. A just pardon does not mean chaos or the state abandoning its role in protecting society, but rather it means its acknowledgment of the existence of a cumulative imbalance that cannot be addressed except by an exceptional measure that opens the door to justice, reconciliation, and reintegration.
Hence, any amnesty law should be based on a set of basic principles: inclusion according to objective, non-sectarian criteria; Respect the principle of equality before the law; Addressing the conditions of detainees who have been detained for a long time without final sentences; Review files that contain suspicions of torture, pressure, or politicization; Refusing to use amnesty to exonerate one group and exclude others; Linking this path to real judicial reform that prevents the tragedy from recurring in the future.
The goal is not only to get people out of prisons, but to restore respect for the idea of justice itself. If the amnesty is not accompanied by serious reform of the judiciary, strengthening fair trial guarantees, and putting an end to political interference in the work of judges, we will be faced with a temporary solution to a crisis that can be repeated. Justice is not achieved by a single pardon, but by a state that respects its constitution, an independent judiciary, and institutions that are not subject to the logic of supremacy.
In conclusion, Lebanon today stands at a clear crossroads: either moving towards a true general amnesty law, fair, comprehensive and non-selective, that opens the door to a responsible national treatment of this thorny issue; Or continue with the approach of quotas, discrimination, and postponement, with the risks it poses to civil peace and trust in institutions.
People no longer wait for promises or are satisfied with seasonal speeches and statements. The families of the detained and oppressed are waiting for concrete actions, fair legislation, and a courageous national decision. Representatives today face a historical responsibility that cannot be shied away from: either a state that respects its citizens and treats them equally in law and dignity, or a continuation of the path of injustice that will only lead to more tension and division.
It remains that a general amnesty, if formulated fairly, may constitute a gateway to true national reconciliation, but if it is formulated selectively, it will be a new milestone in the record of Lebanese disappointments. Between these two options, not only the fates of the detainees and prisoners are determined, but also the image of the state itself: is it a state of law and citizenship, or a state of balances of power and exceptions? Is the law an instrument of justice, or a new cover for an old injustice?
D. Ibrahim Al-Arab
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General amnesty between the principle of constitutional equality and the dangers of selective justice
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