دستور نيوز
Raphael Ben Levy
Tuesday 28 April 2026 – 14:54
Source: independent Arabic
Cooperation between Israel and the United States during the war with Iran represents the culmination of a long transformation in the relationship between the two countries. For years, Washington practically played the role of a sponsor for Israel, providing funding to purchase American military equipment and a diplomatic umbrella (including protection using veto power in the UN Security Council), in exchange for general agreement with American policy directions and close cooperation in the fields of intelligence and military technology. With the recent joint military operation against a common enemy, the relationship entered a qualitatively different phase. Instead of acting alone or being excluded from a US-led coalition, as was the case during the Gulf Wars, Israel acted as a full partner, sharing with US forces the definition of operational objectives and responsibilities.
However, Israel’s new status also revealed how outdated the existing framework for defense industrial cooperation between the United States and Israel is. For 50 years, the United States has provided Israel with funds to purchase American-made equipment. This model, dating back to the Cold War era, was originally intended to strengthen the capabilities of an emerging state surrounded by hostile neighbors, while establishing a measure of American influence over Israeli policy in order to protect Washington’s relations with Arab countries. This framework has served both parties well for decades, but it is no longer appropriate for the reality of the Middle East today. Israel has become a major regional power, enjoys an advanced economy, and is no longer at odds with a number of its neighbors. It no longer needs American financial aid, neither to survive nor to thrive.
In this context, political leaders in both Israel and the United States have begun to acknowledge the outdated nature of the existing arrangement. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, citing growing concern within the Israeli security establishment that reliance on American largesse unnecessarily restricted Israel’s freedom of military action, expressed his conviction that the country had “come of age,” calling for a reduction in American military aid over the “next 10 years.” On the other hand, the administration of President Donald Trump adhered to a firm position calling on partners and allies around the world to wean themselves from American subsidies and grants, and to hold them responsible for financing their defense needs themselves. Meanwhile, criticism of US military aid to Israel began to increase and became common on both sides of the political spectrum in the United States.
Washington’s “record” aid to Israel, how will it be divided?
The convergence of deepening strategic ties, mutual recognition of the disadvantages of the patronage relationship, and political polarization in the United States provided a rare opportunity for both the United States and Israel to renew their relationship. Washington should maintain the mutually beneficial aspects of technological, intelligence, and military cooperation, but in return it should stop providing aid to Israel, allowing it to rely on itself. Instead of being a subordinate, Israel should be a true partner of the United States.
Privileges of the relationship between sponsor and follower
The United States became the main supplier of arms to Israel in the wake of the Six-Day War in 1967, after France, the country’s main sponsor, imposed an arms embargo on Israel and sided with the Arab countries. Initially, Washington provided Israel with long-term loans to purchase American fighter aircraft, but after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the Nixon and Carter administrations replaced these loans with grants, with the aim of facilitating Israel’s withdrawal from the areas surrounding the Suez Canal, and later from the Sinai Peninsula.
Subsequent US administrations chose to renew and increase aid to compensate for the security risks Israel endured during the Oslo process. Over the next three decades, the model evolved, as non-defense-related aid and the portion of defense aid allocated to the purchase of Israeli-made weapons were gradually eliminated, with funding for missile defense cooperation added. The current formula was codified in a memorandum of understanding in 2016 that extends until 2028, and provides for annual US funding of $3.3 billion to purchase American-made equipment, in addition to $500 million for joint missile defense projects. This is equivalent, in 2026, to about seven percent of Israel’s approved defense budget.
Supporters of this arrangement in both countries argued that US aid represents tangible evidence of Washington’s support for Israel, enhances deterrence in the face of its enemies, and demonstrates continued US commitment and influence in the region. In contrast, others saw the aid model as mutually beneficial, with Israel getting much-needed equipment, while the United States directed taxpayer money to support and maintain manufacturing jobs. They believe that this arrangement constitutes a kind of free propaganda for American weapons manufacturers, as Israel’s use of these weapons highlights the superiority of American systems and encourages other countries to acquire them.
There is a lot of validity to these arguments. The aid is indeed a symbol of American support, and contributes to strengthening the capabilities of the Israeli army, creating jobs in the United States and increasing American arms sales to third parties. However, the benefits of aid no longer outweigh the strategic, economic, and political disadvantages associated with maintaining a framework designed when Israel was an emerging state searching for a reliable sponsor.
This is because the current framework weakens Israeli deterrence by perpetuating the image of Israel as a dependent state unable to rely on itself. The symbolic value of the aid, no matter how great, was not enough to prevent Hamas from attacking Israel on October 7, 2023, nor to prevent Iran and its other proxies from launching their attacks in the months and years that followed. In fact, Israel’s opponents were only deterred thanks to its own capabilities and its clear willingness to use them.
Israel must move beyond the position of a subordinate to become a genuine partner of the United States
Israeli foreign policy has witnessed a significant change since the signing of the recent memorandums of understanding. In the past, US administrations have offered increased aid as an incentive for Israel to enter into peace negotiations with the Palestinians. In 2000, for example, US President Bill Clinton pledged to increase military aid by about a third over 10 years, with the aim of encouraging Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to make an unprecedented offer to establish a Palestinian state, at Camp David. During 2007, US President George W. Bush agreed to a new and expanded 10-year memorandum of understanding with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, ahead of the Annapolis summit later that year. The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding, agreed upon between US President Barack Obama and Netanyahu, was widely considered an incentive to strengthen Israel’s security after the signing of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the nuclear deal with Iran that Israel strongly opposed. But the general mood of Israeli public opinion and its political leadership has changed since October 7, 2023. The country is no longer willing to risk its security, and is unlikely to consider any policies that would leave it vulnerable to invasion or missile and missile attacks.
This arrangement does not seem economically logical for Israel, as the Israeli economy has grown significantly since the adoption of the aid model during the 1970s. At that time, American aid represented about 19 percent of Israel’s gross domestic product and 23 percent of its general budget. Since then, the country’s GDP has increased 10-fold in real terms. However, the value of aid remained at about $3 billion annually. When inflation was taken into account, its actual value declined. Today, aid represents less than one percent of the gross domestic product, and slightly less than three percent of the state budget.
Israel’s dependence on the American defense industry has also hindered its domestic industry, especially its independent capabilities to produce munitions. When there is money in US dollars to spend, it is easier to simply buy off-the-shelf munitions from the United States, rather than make the long-term commitment to orders that Israeli manufacturers need to justify maintaining production lines.
Finally, the dynamic of the patron-subordinate relationship began to undermine widespread political support for the coalition within the United States. In light of deep partisan polarization in the United States, the need for Congress to repeatedly pass legislation to ensure the continued flow of aid unnecessarily inserts Israel into the midst of American domestic politics, and may make its behavior a focus of political tension and controversy.
In 2024, aid allocations to Israel were disrupted due to disagreements in Congress regarding aid provided to Ukraine and US border security. In the same year, the Biden administration withheld some munitions during critical periods of the war against Hamas. With positive attitudes toward Israel currently declining among American public opinion (a poll conducted by the Pew Center this April showed that 60 percent of Americans have a negative view of Israel), a number of lawmakers have become prepared to take positions opposing aid. This month, 40 Democratic members of the Senate supported a bill that would have prevented the sale of some military equipment to Israel, while all 52 Republicans voted against the project. For years, Israel has viewed bipartisan support as essential to ensuring the continued flow of aid. Today, the presence of aid contributes to undermining this bipartisan support.
Beyond aid
The expiration of the current Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel in 2028 represents an opportunity to set new terms for the relationship. A new agreement for 2028–2038 should set a gradual path for ending US defense grants. Naturally, Israel will feel the loss of US military aid. The country bears enormous security costs, as it constantly invests between four and six percent of its gross domestic product in defense, a higher percentage than most other democratic countries. Finding alternatives to US grants will require budget adjustments and long-term reforms. However, with a GDP of $610 billion and a growing economy, Israel should be able to make a gradual transition away from aid toward fully financing its defense purchases.
Without American aid, Israel may search for alternative sources for some of the capabilities it is currently purchasing with funding from these grants, especially as it seeks to expand its local production of munitions. However, Israel is not prepared to develop and manufacture its own combat aircraft platforms, which is the area in which the bulk of the aid is spent. Even after the flow of aid stops, Israel will continue to purchase these platforms from the United States at levels close to current, but it will pay for them from its own resources, rather than recycling American taxpayers’ money into the American economy. It will continue to use and develop American weapons, thus enhancing its position in international markets, as it does today.
The partnership model should preserve elements of the current framework that are mutually beneficial, particularly in the area of ballistic missile defence. In this area, Israel and the United States are already working collaboratively to direct the additional $500 million provided for in the current Memorandum of Understanding: the United States provides most of the funding, while Israel leads R&D activities, and the two countries share intellectual property and manufacturing processes. The United States and Israel should expand this cooperation to meet their needs, including the Trump administration’s new “Golden Dome” missile defense project and Israel’s continued need to defend itself against long-range missiles from Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen.
The new framework should continue to preserve Israel’s qualitative military edge. The two countries should maintain existing fast-track mechanisms to ensure Israel’s access to advanced US defense technologies and reduce bureaucratic delays, including the rapid notification mechanism for Congress, typically used with treaty allies, even after Israel begins financing its purchases independently. These mechanisms should also be expanded to include an Israeli commitment to give priority to the United States in obtaining Israeli technology, such as the Trophy active protection system, which the US military uses to protect armored vehicles from anti-tank missiles.
Take responsibility
Israel, which is independent and able to finance its army itself, will be an important asset for the United States in the Middle East and beyond, as it can represent a fulcrum for the pro-American camp in the region, along with the Gulf states. Thus, it can allow the United States to redirect its attention and resources towards priorities outside the region, especially in the Western Hemisphere, and within the framework of competition with China in the Indo-Pacific region, and present itself as a model of a self-reliant ally, which is in line with the direction of an administration that has clearly expressed its desire for more self-reliant partners and allies.
Ultimately, the transition away from US military aid should not be viewed as a weakening of US-Israel relations, but rather as a natural development of a relationship that has matured over decades. Israel’s growing economic and military power allows it to bear greater responsibility for its defense, while contributing more effectively to achieving Washington’s strategic goals, which intersect with a number of Israel’s interests. By replacing the patronage-based aid structure with a deeper relationship in the technological, industrial, and strategic areas, the two countries can build a partnership better suited to the geopolitical realities of the 21st century.
Published articles represent the opinion of their authors
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America and Israel: From patronage to equality – Voice of Lebanon – Voice of Lebanon
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اراء و اقلام الدستور – America and Israel: From patronage to equality – Voice of Lebanon – Voice of Lebanon
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