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After the brutal war between the United States and Israel on the one hand, and Iran and its agents in the region on the other hand, almost pushed the world to the brink of a broader confrontation, approaching the logic of global war, the scene today appears to have relatively calmed down, but this calm is not peace, but rather a repositioning under pressure. The war that extended from deep within Iran to the arenas connected to it, and touched energy lines and sensitive sea lanes, revealed that the region is no longer an arena of local conflict, but rather a point of intersection of international interests in which any imbalance can be immediately reflected. on the global economy and security.
The outbreak of this war was not the result of a moment of emotion or a sudden incident, but rather the result of a long path of gradual escalation, a struggle over the nuclear program, an accelerating missile race, and the expansion of networks of regional influence, in exchange for an American and Israeli decision to move from a policy of containment to an attempt to break the existing balance and impose new rules of deterrence. With the collapse of the lines separating direct and indirect war, the confrontation turned into an open test, that is, targeting depth, pressure on infrastructure, and exchanged messages on the verge of a comprehensive explosion.
Despite the relative decline in the pace of operations, the danger has not passed, as the reasons that sparked the war are still present, and are even more complex. Iran has not reached the breaking point that would push it to radically change its behavior, and US President Donald Trump has not yet decided between establishing a conditional settlement, or going further in the pressure, at a time when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seeks to translate the results of the confrontation into a permanent regional reality that reshapes the balance of power. Between these conflicting options, the question remains open: Is what we are witnessing the end of the war? Or just a fragile truce before a tougher round?
The truth is that no one has the answer, because what has changed is not only the level of escalation, but the nature of the conflict itself.
A forced founding moment for a new Middle East
This is because what happened and is happening today is not a passing war between the United States and Iran, but rather a moment for the forced establishment of a new Middle East in which power, influence and maps will be redistributed under fire, not at the negotiating table. This war was not only fought to overthrow a regime or curb a nuclear program, but rather to determine who would write the rules of the future region: Donald Trump and his successor, Washington? Or the Tehran regime and its system? Or Benjamin Netanyahu, who seeks to translate the war into a permanent geopolitical reality?
So, the war between America and Iran was not fought just because Washington wanted to curb a nuclear or missile program, nor just because Israel wanted to complete the strike that had previously begun against the Iranian military structure, but because in its essence it is a war over the shape of the future region: who controls the corridors, who has the right to deter, who imposes security conditions, who is allowed to be a regional center, and who is pushed to retreat.
The facts announced so far indicate that the war that began on the 28th of last February came after the failure of a previous negotiating path, and then turned into an American-Israeli operation, aimed at reducing Iran’s ability to enrich, missile, naval, and regional arms networks, while Tehran responded by expanding the clash to a level that threatens the Strait of Hormuz, energy, and Washington’s regional allies. This alone reveals that the battle is not technical about enrichment or expulsion devices, but rather strategic about who governs the architecture of the new Middle East, and the deeper reason for the war is that the two sides have reached a mutual conviction that the time of soft containment is over.
Washington and Tel Aviv believe that keeping Iran at the threshold of nuclear capability, while continuing its missile program and its ability to arm allies and proxies, means that any new Middle East will be born under the roof of Iranian blackmail. On the other hand, Tehran sees that American pressure is not just an attempt to modify behavior, but rather a project to return it within its geopolitical borders, and strip it of the power it has built over decades. For this reason, the Iranian discourse since before the outbreak of the war seemed direct, that the United States wants, according to the speech of former guide Ali Khamenei, to “swallow Iran” and regain control over its resources and decision-making, not just negotiate with it.
Hence, this war was fought for three overlapping goals. The direct American goal is to break the solid structure of Iranian power, missiles, naval capabilities, and the ability to arm allies, while preventing Iran from possessing a nuclear weapon. While the broader Israeli goal is to overthrow the idea of the Iranian Ring of Fire extending from Tehran to the Mediterranean, or at least to dismantle its ability to operate as a connected system. The completely undeclared goal is to redistribute regional power so that alternative corridors to Hormuz, linking oil and gas to the Mediterranean, and integrating Israel into the energy, transportation, and security infrastructure become direct results of the post-war period, not just postponed ideas. This meaning appeared publicly in Netanyahu’s words when, after the war, he proposed oil and gas pipelines crossing westward across the Arabian Peninsula to reach Israeli ports on the Mediterranean. He considered this “a real change that will follow this war,” and “choke points will be removed forever.”
Where is this war headed?
Therefore, according to the data, the outcome of the war does not lead to a decisive and clean victory for any party, but rather to one of four overlapping paths, with one path being preferred over another according to the ability of the mediators to establish a ceasefire under heavy conditions.
The first path, which is currently the most likely, is a conditional coercive settlement, that is, a ceasefire, which does not mean reconciliation, but rather imposing restrictions on the Iranian nuclear and missile program, and linking any regional calm to the file of Tehran’s allies, especially Lebanon.
Current indicators push in this direction, because Washington confirms the continuation of the talks and describes them as fruitful, while the information coming from Tehran says that Iran is still reviewing the American proposal and has not closed the door completely, in parallel with its insistence on including Lebanon and “resistance groups” in any broader agreement.
As for the second path, it is a controlled regional war of attrition, neither a comprehensive war that will quickly bring down the Iranian regime, nor actual peace, but rather rounds of bombing, mutual strikes, and constant tension in the energy and energy corridors, with continued pressure on Lebanon, Iraq, and perhaps Yemen. This scenario will remain in place because the United States has strengthened its military presence in the region with thousands of Marines and sailors, and has discussed additional options including Hormuz and even Kharg Island, which means that the tools of escalation are still fully present.
On the other hand, the war has shown so far that Iran is capable of making the costs of the entire region rise, by putting pressure on energy, navigation, and oil markets.
While the third path is the expansion of the war from Iran to the Lebanese front, as an arena for compensation, and this is a very serious possibility, because Israel has publicly distinguished between its front with Iran and its operations against “Hezbollah,” while Tehran insists that any ceasefire include Lebanon as well. This gap in particular is extremely dangerous. If Iran accepts a deal of its own and does not succeed in extracting an umbrella for Lebanon, Lebanon may turn into an arena for the continuation of the war, not an arena after it. If Tehran insists on linking the two fronts, the entire settlement may falter. For this reason, part of the future of the war will not only be decided in Tehran and Washington, but also in Beirut and southern Lebanon.
Here comes the fourth path, which is the most ambiguous, and is represented by internal Iranian change without the complete overthrow of the regime. Washington and some Israeli circles have bet, and are betting, that a broad strike might produce an internal rift or even a moment of change in leadership, and put forward the idea of a “historic opportunity” to bring about a transformation in Tehran, but this bet is not guaranteed. In fact, the same estimates quoted from American circles indicate that the alternative might be more extreme, not more moderate. Therefore, talk about “overthrowing the regime” seems so far more part of psychological warfare than a guaranteed mature result.
The moment to reshape the territory has arrived
Based on all of the above, the region after this war will not be the same as before it, even if it ends with a temporary understanding. The first reason is that the ceiling of clashes has risen, Iran is no longer immune from depth strikes, and America and Israel are no longer satisfied with indirect war. The second reason is that the economy has become part of the combat doctrine, Hormuz, and energy, corridors, ports, and pipelines have all become negotiating and military targets together. The third reason is that the proxy file is no longer marginal, but rather marginal. He moved to the heart of the negotiation itself, as evidenced by the explicit Iranian link between any ceasefire and the Lebanese front.
So, this war was fought because everyone felt that the moment to reshape the region had arrived. America wants a Middle East that is less Iranian and more subject to the equations of deterrence, corridors, and integration. Israel wants a Middle East in which the logic of the Iranian naval blockade is replaced by transit networks towards the Mediterranean. Iran is waging the battle because it knows that the loss is not only the loss of a negotiating position, but the loss of its position as a determining power in the region. Therefore, the likely outcome of the war is not a real peace, but a settlement that rearranges the ranks. Iran is weaker, and Israel is stronger. Integrated, the Gulf is more organized in security, and Lebanon threatens to be used as a field for settling scores unless a clear position is taken for it within any future arrangements.
Here a pivotal question arises: What will the “new Middle East” look like? Are there any published maps?
According to a follow-up of statements and positions, the “new Middle East” being formed is based on five interconnected pillars, the summary of which is that the region after the war is not what it was before.
The new Middle East is not taking shape as a declared map on paper, but rather as a system of influence, corridors, alliances, and new rules of engagement, and what is happening today is not only redrawing borders with fire, but rather rearranging who enters the system, who is isolated from it, who turns into an arena, and who becomes a transit node for energy, trade, and security. The statements and steps of recent months have moved from pushing towards expanding regional integration to reviving major corridors such as the IMEC, that is, the economic corridor between India, the Middle East and Europe, to talking about linking the Gulf to the Mediterranean, to linking any truce with Iran to Lebanon, all of which indicate that the conflict is no longer only over the land, but rather over the form of the region itself and its function in the global economy and security.
In the official Iranian political and intellectual discourse, the description of the new Middle East emerges as a cover for the “Greater Israel” project, with maps that include several Arab countries, including Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and parts of Saudi Arabia and Sinai. The Israeli Prime Minister envisions the establishment of a “hexagon” of alliances around or within the Middle East, which includes countries from Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Arab world, and that this system will include India, Arab and African countries, Greece, and Cyprus, in addition to other Asian countries.
From Netanyahu’s point of view, these countries “share a vision different from the extremist Shiite axis and the rising extremist Sunni axis,” and that “cooperation between us can achieve great benefits, and will also, of course, guarantee our strength and our future,” in a statement before Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel.
What are the five interconnected pillars?
Middle Eastern corridors, not slogans
The new standard is no longer just who owns weapons, but rather who owns the port, the pipeline, the electricity line, the land crossing, and the logistical node. For this reason, talk has returned strongly about the Indo-Middle East-European corridor, about connecting Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon electrically, about making Iraq and Turkey an alternative land corridor, and about transporting oil and gas to the Mediterranean instead of keeping the region hostage to the sea straits alone. This means that the new region is built on economic and security interconnection networks that make the useful countries the ones that can be connected, not the countries drowning in the sea. Open wars.
Middle East composite deterrence
The recent war with Iran pushed the region to a new deterrence model, that is, direct strikes, targeting military infrastructure, pressure on ports and straits, and messages to allies and agents at the same time in exchange for threatening to close Hormuz, talk of targeting energy facilities, and linking the ceasefire in Iran and Lebanon, all of which are indicators that any upcoming arrangement will not only be diplomatic, but rather security and military par excellence. Any country that wants to enter this new Middle East must prove two things: that it is capable of controlling its territory, and that it Do not allow it to become a permanent platform for other people’s wars.
Middle East Selective Inclusion
Naturally, not all countries in the region will be included to the same degree. There is a nucleus that is being installed as a central system for the next stage, other countries will enter under conditions, and countries will be left outside the circle or on its margins.
According to the current path, the likely nucleus includes Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar to a different degree, Jordan, Egypt, Israel, and Turkey, with varying roles for Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon according to their ability to adapt. This nucleus has one thing in common: it is located at the intersection of security, energy, corridors, and reconstruction. As for Iran, the project does not want to integrate it in its current form as a military expansion force. Rather, it wants to either subjugate it, contain it, or push it into a less offensive and more withdrawn version, and even the recent Gulf positions reflect this logic. What is not necessarily required is to overthrow Iran immediately, but rather to change its behavior and prevent it from retaining the same tools of sabotage after the war.
Middle East Conditional Reconstruction
Hence, the reconstruction file is not only a humanitarian file, but rather a political tool to re-engineer the affected countries. In Syria, the reconstruction numbers are enormous, which means that whoever funds will demand a political and security return. In Lebanon as well, the promised economic recovery is conditional on reform, stability, and the withdrawal of weapons. In other words, financing will become a means to redefine the state, its function, the limits of its weapons, and its foreign relations. Therefore, Syria and Lebanon are candidates to be part of the new Middle East, but not as established powers, but as two arenas to be rehabilitated with conditions.
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The New Middle East…Who expresses and who is excluded? – Voice of Lebanon – Voice of Lebanon
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اراء و اقلام الدستور – The New Middle East…Who expresses and who is excluded? – Voice of Lebanon – Voice of Lebanon
المصدر : www.vdl.me